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its needs. At any rate, no settlement existed at Tel ‘Eton in the Roman period, 
and the tombs probably served the population of the few large settlements 
that existed nearby, such as Kh. ‘Eton and Kh. Hauran.
Avraham Faust 
Department of Israel Studies 
Bar-Ilan University 
Ramat-Gan 529002  
Israel 
avraham.faust@biuc.ac.il
Hayah Katz 
Department of History, Philosophie, and Jewish Studies 
The Open University of Israel 
Raanana 43107 
Israel 
hayahka@openu.ac.il
Mohr Siebeck
Hebrew Bible and 
Ancient Israel

Volume 

Gender and Method
Jacqueline E. Lapsley
Introduction: Gender and Method  –
Cynthia Ruth Chapman
Modern Terms and their Ancient Non-Equivalents. 
Patrilineality and Gender in the Historical Study 
of the Bible  –
Christine Mitchell 
Coming, Going, and Knowing. Reading Sex 
and Embodiment in Hebrew Narrative  –
Carol Meyers
Double Vision: Textual and Archaeological Images 
of Women  –
Silvia Schroer
Genderforschung, altorientalische Kunst 
und biblische Texte  –
Dennis T. Olson 
Crossing Boundaries: Moses the Man, 
Masculinities and Methods  –
New Findings
Avraham Faust and Hayah Katz, Tel ‘Eton Cemetery: 
An Introduction  –
e-offprint of the author with publisher‘s permission.
Hebrew Bible and Ancient Israel
Herausgegeben von Gary N. Knoppers (Notre Dame IN), Oded Lipschits 
(Tel Aviv), Carol A. Newsom (Atlanta GA) und Konrad Schmid (Zürich)
Redaktion: Phillip Michael Lasater (Zürich)
Die Annahme zur Veröffentlichung erfolgt schriftlich und unter dem Vor -
behalt, dass das Manuskript nicht anderweitig zur Veröffentlichung angeboten 
wurde. Mit der Annahme zur Veröffentlichung überträgt der Autor dem Verlag 
das ausschließliche Verlagsrecht für die Publikation in gedruckter und elektro-
nischer Form. Weitere Informationen dazu und zu den beim Autor 
verbleibenden Rechten finden Sie unter www.mohr.de/hebai. Ohne Erlaubnis 
des Verlags ist eine Vervielfältigung oder Verbreitung der ganzen Zeitschrift 
oder von Teilen daraus in gedruckter oder elektronischer Form nicht gestattet.
Bitte wenden Sie sich an rights@mohr.de.
Redaktionsadresse
Professor Dr. Konrad Schmid
Theologische Fakultät der Universität Zürich
Kirchgasse 9
CH-8001 Zürich
Switzerland
E-mail: hebai@theol.uzh.ch
Online-Volltext
Im Abonnement für Institutionen und Privatpersonen ist der freie Zugang zum 
Online-Volltext enthalten. Institutionen mit mehr als 20.000 Nutzern bitten 
wir um Einholung eines Preisangebots direkt beim Verlag. Kontakt: elke.
brixner@mohr.de. Um den Online-Zugang für Institutionen/Bibliotheken 
einzurichten, gehen Sie bitte zur Seite: www.ingentaconnect.com/register/ 
 institutional. Um den Online-Zugang für Privatpersonen einzurichten, gehen 
Sie bitte zur Seite: www.ingentaconnect.com/register/personal
Verlag: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, Postfach 2040, 72010 Tübingen
Vertrieb erfolgt über den Buchhandel. 
© 2016 Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, Tübingen
Die Zeitschrift und alle in ihr enthaltenen einzelnen Beiträge und Abbildungen 
sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der 
engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlags 
unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Über-
setzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in 
elektronischen Systemen.
Satz: Martin Fischer, Tübingen.
Druck: Gulde-Druck, Tübingen.
ISSN 2192-2276 (Gedruckte Ausgabe)
ISSN 2192-2284 (Online-Ausgabe)
Hebrew Bible and Ancient Israel
Edited by Gary N. Knoppers (Notre Dame IN), Oded Lipschits 
(Tel Aviv), Carol A. Newsom (Atlanta GA), and Konrad Schmid (Zürich)
Redaction: Phillip Michael Lasater (Zürich)
Hebrew Bible and Ancient Israel publishes only invited articles. Submission of 
a paper will be held to imply that it contains original unpublished work and is 
not being submitted for publication elsewhere. All articles are refereed by 
specialists. Acceptance for publication will be given in writing. When an article 
is accepted for publication, the exclusive copyright is granted to Mohr Siebeck 
for publication in a print and an electronic version. Further information on 
this and the rights retained by the author can be found at www.mohr.de/hebai. 
No one may reproduce or distribute the entire journal or parts of it in a print 
or an electronic version without the publisher’s permission. Please contact 
rights@mohr.de.
Please do not send any unsolicited review copies. The publisher and the editors 
reserve the right to keep unsolicited books.
Contact address:
Professor Dr. Konrad Schmid
Theologische Fakultät der Universität Zürich
Kirchgasse 9
CH-8001 Zürich
Switzerland
E-mail: hebai@theol.uzh.ch
Full Text Online
Free access to the full text online is included in a subscription. We ask institu-
tions with more than 20,000 users to obtain a price quote directly from the 
publisher. Contact: elke.brixner@mohr.de. In order to set up online access for 
institutions/libraries, please go to: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/register/
institutional. In order to set up online access for private persons, please go to:
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/register/personal
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, Postfach 2040, 72010 Tübingen
Can be purchased at bookstores.
© 2016 Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, Tübingen
The journal and all the individual articles and illustrations contained in it are 
protected by copyright. Any utilization beyond the narrow confines of copy-
right law without the publisher’s consent is punishable by law. This applies 
in particular to copying, translations, microfilming and storage and processing 
in electronic systems.
Printed in Germany.
Typeset by Martin Fischer, Tübingen.
Printed by Gulde-Druck, Tübingen.
ISSN 2192-2276 (Print Edition)
ISSN 2192-2284 (Online Edition)
e-offprint of the author with publisher‘s permission.
DOI: 219222716X14683342142307
Christine Mitchell 
Coming, Going, and Knowing
Reading Sex and Embodiment in Hebrew Narrative
This article both summarizes and analyzes recent feminist scholarship in literary 
studies and, in light of that analysis, examines a range of Hebrew terms for sexual 
intercourse. Particular attention is paid to Genesis and Judges.
My first real introduction to both feminist readings of the Bible and literary 
readings of the Bible came early on in graduate school in the early 1990s, 
when I was required to read the work of Mieke Bal: first Lethal Love, then 
Death and Dissymmetry, and finally Murder and Difference.1 Bal’s work had 
a profound impact on my development as a scholar, both as a feminist reader 
and as a literary critic. Her influence will be seen in this essay. Nevertheless, 
in the intervening two decades feminist readings of biblical texts have moved 
on. In some ways, the measure of Bal’s success may be that few explicitly lit-
erary feminist readings of Hebrew narrative have been published, particu-
larly of the book of Judges. Perhaps after these two decades, it is now time to 
return to a feminist-literary reading of Judges and other narrative texts, for-
tified by the work of gender theorists like Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz and 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, work that appeared after Bal’s trilogy, and which has 
had limited impact on feminist biblical studies.2
1 M. Bal, Lethal Love: Feminist Literary Readings of Biblical Love Stories (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1987); eadem, Death and Dissymmetry: The Politics of Coher-
ence in the Book of Judges (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); eadem, Murder 
and Difference: Gender, Genre, and Scholarship on Sisera’s Death (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988).
2 J. Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology 
and Feminist Theory,” Theatre Journal 40 (1988): 519–531; eadem, Gender Trouble: 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999); eadem, Undo-
ing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004); E. Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal 
Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); eadem, Becoming Undone: 
Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); 
E. Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003).
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Gender and the subject
In one way in particular, Bal’s work was the end point of (literary) feminist 
readings of the Bible: grounded especially in the work of French feminist 
thinkers like Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray, Bal’s reading operated within 
a certain essentialism of gender and sexuality. Most feminist biblical schol-
arship – though not all – worked within Anglo-American feminist thought 
that privileged the concept of gender as socially and culturally constructed. 
The Freudian/Lacanian basis of some of Bal’s readings, in particular, was 
generally not repeated in feminist biblical scholarship.3 Although pro-
foundly influenced by Bal, this essentialist aspect of her readings has always 
been the most problematic for me. I was always more convinced by con-
structivist ideas, especially for the importance and possibilities they gave to 
agency and subjectivity.
Now, well into the new century, I find that some work of the very late 
20th century that has come to permeate feminist thought outside the biblical 
guild does not seem to have had an impact within the guild. The dismantling 
of the theoretical basis for the concept of gender constructivism has been 
thoroughly discussed, both in the work of philosophers like Seyla Benhabib 
and in the work of theorists such as those cited above.4 Perhaps the writer 
whose work has had most impact in biblical studies is Butler. Her concept of 
the performativity of gender as put forward in Gender Trouble is cited and 
used productively, for example, by Cynthia Chapman, Elizabeth Stuart, and 
Teresa Hornsby, and recently in several of the essays in the Oxford Encyclo-
pedia of the Bible and Gender Studies.5 In Gender Trouble, Butler argues that 
“the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological sta-
tus apart from the various acts which constitute its reality.”6 That is, it is the 
way the body moves, dresses, is adorned, gestures, positions itself, etc. that 
conforms to a constructed gender norm. Gender is an effect, not an essence. 
3 The exception is I. N. Rashkow, The Phallacy of Genesis: A Feminist-Psychoanalytic 
Approach (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993).
4 E. g., S. Benhabib, “The Debate over Women and Moral Theory Revisited,” in Feminists 
Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse (ed. J. Meehan; New York: Rout-
ledge, 1995), 181–203, here 194.
5 Cynthia R. Chapman, The Gendered Language of Warfare in the Israelite-Assyrian 
Encounter (HSM 62; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2004); E. Stuart, “Proverbs,” in 
The Queer Bible Commentary (ed. D. Guest et al.; London: SCM, 2006), 325–337; 
T. Hornsby, “Ezekiel,” in The Queer Bible Commentary (ed. D. Guest et al.; London: 
SCM, 2006), 412–426; J. M. O’Brien (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and 
Gender Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
6 Butler, Gender Trouble (see n. 2), 172.
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In a later essay, Butler warns against confusing gender norms – as culturally 
constructed – with the concept of gender itself. “The conflation of gender 
with masculine/feminine, man/woman, male/ female, thus performs the 
very naturalization that the notion of gender is meant to forestall.”7 A cul-
turally-constructed gender is not the same thing as gender as an ontologi-
cal category. The essay goes on to demonstrate the epistemological problem 
with reifying the sex-gender distinction as a set of two binaries: there is no 
space for metamorphosis of either a body or a gender without the correlative 
metamorphosis of the other, often through the alignment of an individual’s 
sex with gender.8
Already in the mid-1990s, before Butler’s best-known work, Grosz was 
able to say that for a number of writers, “There also is a wariness of the sex/
gender distinction …. The body cannot be understood as a neutral screen, 
a biological tabula rasa onto which masculine or feminine could be indif-
ferently projected. Instead of seeing sex as an essentialist and gender as a 
constructionist category, these thinkers are concerned to undermine the 
dichotomy.”9 She went on to problematize the whole philosophy of a fixed 
body, concluding in part that “the body is a pliable entity whose determi-
nate form is provided not simply by biology but through the interaction of 
modes of psychical and physical inscription.”10 However, most theorizing 
about the body by men has taken the male body as the universal norm and 
sexual difference has been categorized as deviations from the male norm. 
The specifics of the male body, for example, are not taken as representative 
of masculinity, but as representative of humanity.11 Grosz tried to read these 
“universal” discourses of the body as men’s discourses of the body; while 
men’s theorizing about the body might imply that a man does not have a 
body, Grosz demonstrated that bodily discourses describe men.
In a similar way, Sedgwick has argued that sexual difference, whether 
essential or constructed, is a tautology. Sexual difference is taken as a cen-
tral fact, and other possibilities for analysis are not considered: “[A] certain, 
stylized violence of sexual differentiation must always be prescribed or self-
assumed – even, where necessary, imposed – simply on the ground that it 
can never be finally ruled out …. The contingent possibilities of thinking 
 7 Butler, Undoing Gender (see n. 2), 42–43.
 8 Ibid., 54–56.
 9 Grosz, Volatile Bodies (see n. 2), 17–18. Grosz is referring to Luce Irigaray, Hélène 
Cixous, Gayatri Spivak, Jane Gallop, Moira Gatens, Vicki Kirby, Judith Butler, Naomi, 
Monique Wittig, “and many others.”
10 Ibid., 187.
11 Ibid., 198.
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otherwise than through ‘sexual difference’ are subordinated to the para-
noid imperative that, if the violence of such gender reification cannot be 
definitively halted in advance, it must at least never arrive on any conceptual 
scene as a surprise.”12 Because sexual difference is assumed, it can never be 
precluded.
The implication of Grosz’s presentation of discourses about the body, 
namely that a man does not have a body, should not come as a surprise. 
Especially since Descartes, and perhaps Plato too, the mind–body dichot-
omy has been linked with the male–female dichotomy, with the mind and 
the male in the privileged position. A whole series of other binaries may 
also be diagrammed and used in (post-)structuralist /semiotic analyses of 
texts. Bal made particular use of these binaries in her discussions of bibli-
cal texts, especially in Lethal Love and Murder and Difference. However, the 
Hebrew Bible is not a product of Western thought, even as it profoundly 
influenced that thought. It is one thing to read biblical texts and their effects 
using a Platonic and Cartesian model; it is entirely another thing to read the 
texts as objects themselves using that model. One thing that literary studies 
has emphasized since the 1980s is the cultural embeddedness of all texts, as 
summarized by Frederic Jameson’s aphorism “Always historicize!” Thus, to 
learn something about the text’s nature – if that is taken as a goal of inter-
pretation pace Umberto Eco – is to learn something about the cultural and 
historical context of the text’s production.13 Since other essays in this collec-
tion address broader cultural aspects of the Hebrew Bible’s production, in 
this essay I remain within literary readings.
To say that reading using Western dichotomies may be methodologically 
erroneous is not to say that dichotomies or binaries did not exist in Hebrew 
literature. In fact, Hebrew- and cognate-language literatures exhibit a high 
degree of binaristic thinking: the word-pairs and parallelism exhibited in 
elevated prose display binaries embedded deeply in the literary style. How-
ever, those binaries are not necessarily evidence of dichotomous or dualistic 
thought. For example, in the common word-pairs ףסכ–בהז and םימש–ץרא 
there is no reason to think that silver was superior to gold (or vice versa), or 
that skies were valued more highly than earth. It is easy to multiply exam-
ples: הקדצ–טפשמ, ןטב–םיעמ, םוי–הליל (justice-righteousness, guts-belly, 
12 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling (see n. 2), 133, emphases original.
13 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); cf. 
J. Culler, The Literary in Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 166–182 
for an analysis of interpretation vs. overinterpretation.
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night-day), etc. Most word-pairs are synonymous or correlative.14 Thus the 
first principle in recognizing and interpreting binaries in biblical texts must 
be that one cannot necessarily plot them onto a simple list of opposites: 
good–bad, valued–denigrated. What follows is that there may not be an 
essentialist epistemology underlying these texts. Value may be contingent; 
that is, locally and situationally shaped.
If value is contingent in biblical texts, then we must restart feminist or 
gender-critical literary readings of those texts. It also means breaking down 
the essentialist–constructivist binary in discussions of gender. This returns 
us to the utility of work such as Butler’s, Grosz’s, and Sedgwick’s: work that 
transgresses boundaries between man and woman, body and mind, self and 
other. This work encompasses a de-privileging of the Cartesian subject in 
Western thought, which may have significant heuristic consequences for 
understanding non-Platonic epistemologies and especially their non-Car-
tesian cultural products.
Focalization/Point-of-view
Returning to the narratology of Bal, and a similar expression in the work of 
Adele Berlin, one of the most useful concepts in Bal’s system of semiology 
is focalization (point-of-view, perspective).15 At its most basic, analysis of 
focalization seeks to answer the question, “Who sees?” Even when the story 
is told by a third-person narrator as in most biblical narrative, we readers 
do not always hover over the scene with a panoramic view. The deictic par-
ticle הנה “behold” is perhaps the most obvious indicator that we are being 
brought to identify with one character rather than another. Alongside הנה, 
we may also consider the common idioms ינפמ/ ינפל, literally “in/from X’s 
face,” and יניעב / יניעל, literally “to/ in X’s eyes.” Both embody the abstract: 
“before X/in X’s presence,” and “in X’s sight/X’s opinion.” In all cases, we 
are brought to identify with X’s position, whether it be spatial, temporal, 
cognitive, emotional, or moral. Furthermore, certain verbs of motion also 
presume a spatial position. The common military idiom אוב/אצי, “to go 
out and come in” suggests that the perspective is that of a fortified position 
(city, fortress, military camp) from which an armed party leaves for battle 
14 W. G. E. Watson, Classical Hebrew Poetry: A Guide to Its Techniques (2nd ed. with cor-
rections; JSOTSup 26; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 128–144.
15 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry (see n. 1), 35–36; eadem, On Story-Telling: Essays in Narra-
tology (ed. D. Jobling; Sonoma: Polebridge, 1991), 75–108; A. Berlin, Poetics and Inter-
pretation of Biblical Narrative (BLS 9; Sheffield: Almond, 1983), 43–82.
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and to which it returns afterwards. Similar spatially-oriented word pairs are 
ךלה–אוב (come-go) and בוש–ךלה (go-return). However, verbs of knowledge 
and perception also allow us to identify a focalizer.
Studies focusing on perspective in biblical texts have usually dealt with 
the aspects of focalization that may be pictured using the heuristic device of 
filmmaking. Berlin’s analysis of Genesis 22 was a masterpiece of this sort of 
interpretation.16 As such, it still emphasizes a certain disembodied form of 
perspective. Even the work of Bal and other feminist readers has been con-
tent to work with the disembodied transcendent spirit that comes to hover 
over the character, from whose perspective we view the story. What hap-
pens if we read from a profound corporeality, as Grosz did? Can we read 
from within the body? Specifically, how do the Hebrew words for sexual 
intercourse, the act of breaching corporeal boundaries, show us how to read 
from a corporeal perspective?
Reading sexual intercourse
There are several verbs, all often read as euphemisms, for sexual intercourse 
in Hebrew. The most common are לא אוב “to come into/enter,” לא ברק “to 
approach to,” עדי “to know/experience,” and תא/םע בכש “to lie with.” There 
are a few other words that are used occasionally, but I will focus on these 
four. Notably, two are verbs of motion, while two are not. I will begin with 
the latter.
The verb עדי “to know” or “to experience” is a common verb in the bibli-
cal corpus, but has a specific sexual sense in several cases. It is used in three 
different kinds of subject–object configurations: man–woman; woman–
man; man–man. The most common is a man as the subject and woman as 
the object (e. g., Gen 4:1, 17, 25; 24:16; 38:26; 1 Sam 1:19; 1 Kgs 1:4). The 
sexual nature of the word is clear in several of these cases: in Gen 4:1, 17, 25 
and 1 Sam 1:19 the construction is “and X experienced his woman and she 
became pregnant/bore ….” In Gen 24:16, Rebekah is described as a הלותב 
“virgin,” qualified with “a man had not experienced her.” In Gen 38:26 and 
1 Kgs 1:4 the lack of sexual intercourse is noted: “And he did not continue to 
experience her,” and “the king did not experience her.” Within the context of 
all these occurrences, the focus is on the experience of the male characters: 
paternity/genealogy; suitable bride; male transgression; male impotence.
16 Berlin, Poetics (see n. 15), 44–58.
e-offprint of the author with publisher‘s permission.
Christine Mitchell 100
It is also possible for a woman to be the subject of עדי in its sexual sense. 
Most of these are part of a description of virginity: Num 31:17, 18, 35; Judg 
21:11, 12; where עדי is part of a longer expression: רכז בכשמל שיא תעדי השא 
“a woman experiencing a man in (the act of) lying-of-a-male.” In these cases 
it is plausible that the instances in Judges 21 were drawn directly from Num-
bers 31: The Judges 21 narrative has many similarities with Numbers 31 in 
the scenario of: battle, extermination, and taking of virgins as booty. The 
other two interesting occurrences of a woman as subject of עדי also pertain 
to a woman’s virginity, but have שיא “a man” alone as the object (without the 
convoluted construction of Numbers 31 and Judges 21). In Gen 19:8, Lot 
describes his daughters to the Sodomians as “my two daughters who have 
not experienced a man”; and in Judg 11:39, Jephthah’s daughter is described 
as “she had not experienced a man.” The verb עדי as a verb of perception is 
also a verb of focalization, giving insight into the perspective of the subject. 
Both men and women focalize sexual intercourse.17
The third configuration, with a man as both subject and object of עדי, 
occurs twice: Gen 19:5 and Judg 19:22. The two episodes are closely linked 
in theme, style and vocabulary; this correspondence in the use of עדי is just 
one of many such similarities between the two passages.18 In Gen 19:5, the 
Sodomians demand that Lot bring out Yhwh’s messengers “so that we may 
experience them”; in Judg 19:22, the Gibeahites demand that the old host 
bring out the Levite “so that we may experience him.” In both episodes, the 
host’s response is to offer women instead of the male guests. When com-
bined with the host’s words, the initial demand by the crowd is clearly sex-
ual: “Do to them whatever seems right to you” (Gen 19:8); “Rape them [ונע 
םתוא] and do to them what seems right to you” (Judg 19:24); the Judg 19:24 
formulation is the most specific. In both episodes the term הלותב “virgin” is 
used to describe at least one of the two women offered: Lot’s two daughters 
and the host’s one daughter; Lot’s two daughters are specifically described 
as “they have not known a man” (above). While in Genesis 19, no-one 
ended up “knowing” anyone in Sodom, there was a good deal of sex after-
wards, none of which is described as “knowing.”19 In fact, in a clever play on 
words, Lot is twice described as follows: “he did not know when she lay 
17 Cf. Bal, Death and Dissymmetry (see n. 1), 53.
18 S. Lasine, “Guest and Host in Judges 19: Lot’s Hospitality in an Inverted World,” JSOT 29 
(1984): 37–59. It is not necessary to agree with his argument that Judges 19 is depend-
ent on Genesis 19, nor to agree with his analysis of the text as a tragi-comedy, in order 
to appreciate the detailed connections he drew between the two texts.
19 Ibid., 40, notes that both Genesis 19 and Judges 19 are followed by efforts to “repopu-
late.”
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down and when she got up” (Gen 19:33, 35). In sum, men and women can 
both know or experience sexual intercourse in these texts, although the per-
spective is always that of a man.
There is one anomalous instance of עדי in the sexual sense, in which a 
man “knows” a woman, but his knowing is not a precursor to conception, 
nor is it used to denote the sexual innocence of a woman: the Gibeahites 
who הב־וללעתיו  התוא  ועדי “knew/experienced her and toyed with her” in 
Judg 19:25. In this case, עדי is used in the same way that the Sodomians and 
Gibeahites wanted to “know/experience” the male stranger(s). The Levite’s 
pilegesh here is “known” as a man. She is “meta-gendered” or “meta-sexual-
ized”: made into a man and then raped as a man.20 She is “toyed with” 
(ללעתה), just as Saul feared being toyed with in 1 Sam 31:4=1 Chr 10:4: 
יב־וללעתהו … ןפ “lest they toy with me”; Saul fears rape, not mockery.21 The 
feminist critic’s question of why the Gibeahites were satisfied with her, a 
woman, instead of the Levite, a man, has always required some analytical 
and critical contortion to be answered.22 Phyllis Trible argued that conflict 
between men could be satisfied by sacrificing a woman.23 Bal first read the 
story as a conflict between patrilocal and virilocal marriage and thus 
explained the use of the pilegesh; later she read the use of know as ironic, 
since as readers we cannot know when the pilegesh dies.24 Ilse Müllner sug-
gested that it was the foreignness of both Levite and pilegesh that allowed 
them to be treated analogously.25 Ken Stone suggested that as it was the Lev-
ite who was the target, raping the Levite’s pilegesh achieved the same goal.26 
20 I use the terms meta-gendered and meta-sexualized in the sense of metamorphosis: the 
change of gender or sex in the epistemological realm of the text.
21 K. Stone, “How a Woman Unmans a King: Gender Reversal and the Woman of Thebez 
in Judges 9,” in From the Margins, Vol. 1: Women of the Hebrew Bible and Their Afterlives 
(ed. P. S. Hawkings and L. Cushing Stahlberg; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2009), 
71–85, here 77.
22 Or not. She can be reduced to a plot device: “[I]n order for the story to have its intended 
effect … a rape-murder had to occur.” See B. Embry, “Narrative Loss, the (important) 
Role of Women, and Community in Judges 19,” in Joshua and Judges (ed. A. Brenner 
and G. A. Yee; Texts @ contexts; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 257–273, here 265.
23 P. Trible, Texts of Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives (OBT; Phila-
delphia: Fortress, 1984), 73–76.
24 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry (see n. 1), 90–92; eadem, “A Body of Writing: Judges 19,” in 
A Feminist Companion to Judges (ed. A. Brenner; FCB 4; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1993), 208–230, here 222–223.
25 I. Müllner, “Lethal Differences: Sexual Violence as Violence against Others in Judges 
19,” in Judges (ed. A. Brenner; FCB 2/4; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 
126–142, here 132–141.
26 K. Stone, “Gender and Homosexuality in Judges 19: Subject-Honor, Object-Shame?” 
JSOT 67 (1995): 87–107, here 100. See the response by M. Carden, “Homophobia and 
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Reading with the concept of corporeality, I suggest that the Gibeahites make 
the woman into a man, into the body of the Levite man they wanted to rape: 
the body of the pilegesh is reconfigured; it is a pliable body, not a fixed one. 
In Judg 19:24 the host uses a masculine plural form to refer to the two 
women: this foreshadows what happens to the pilegesh.27
The Levite’s response to the rape of his pilegesh is not just about covering 
up his own dishonour, nor is it only about disguising his almost-rape. To be 
sure, in his speech to Israel he does change the Gibeahites wanting to 
“know” him to wanting to murder him (Judg 20:5). But he also changes the 
verb used to refer to their actions to his pilegesh: instead of the narrator’s 
description of them knowing (עדי) and toying (ללעתה) with her, in the Lev-
ite’s speech they raped or abused her (ונע  ישגליפ־תאו), just as the old host 
had suggested in his speech cited above. That is, in his account they raped 
her as a woman is raped rather than as a man is raped. This matters to the 
Levite, because if she has been meta-gendered or meta-sexualized, then he 
has been lying with a man all this time. Bad enough that he should have 
been threatened with rape, with penetration of his own body, showing how 
unfixed was his corporeality and how his gender performance could be so 
easily undone.
The verb בכש, while commonly meaning “to lie down” or “to sleep,” and 
particularly prevalent in the formula “to sleep with one’s fathers,” also has a 
sexual sense. The verb in its sexual sense is always used with a particle 
meaning “with,” whether םע, תא, שמא or לצא. It is thus a relational act that 
requires two participants. It is not something done to someone, but rather 
has a transactional or even transgressive aspect. Importantly, it can be used 
with either a man or a woman as the subject, although the two situations 
where it is used by a woman deserve some examination. Also of impor-
tance, it can be used in situations of rape, and these texts also merit exami-
nation. Finally, it is also used to describe sexual acts between two men. But 
most often it is used of a man having sexual intercourse with a woman, 
where the woman’s consent is assumed or irrelevant. An example of (Leah’s) 
assumed consent may be found in Gen 30:15–16: “And Rachel said, ‘So 
Rape in Sodom and Gibeah: A Response to Ken Stone,” JSOT 82 (1999): 83–96, who 
suggested that the Gibeahites succeeded in “queering” the Levite (here p. 91).
27 Perhaps this is preferable to the grammatical and syntactical contortions undertaken 
by some to understand םתוא as referring to the two women and the Levite. Cf. 
R. G. Boling, Judges: A New Translation and Commentary (AB 6A; Garden City: Dou-
bleday, 1975), 276. Of course Boling was hardly aware that there were any women in 
the passage at all, cf. pp. 276–279. Compare “No reading, ancient or modern, should 
miss the simple fact that what happens to the concubine is an utter abomination,” 
Embry, “Narrative Loss” (see n. 22), 262.
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tonight he may lie with you [ךמע  בכשי] for the price of your son’s man-
drakes.’ And Jacob came in from the field …. And he lay with her [בכשיו 
המע] that night.” An example of the irrelevance of consent for the unfolding 
of the plot can be found in a nearby text, Gen 35:22: “And Reuben went and 
lay with [תא בכשיו] Bilhah, his father’s pilegesh.” Yet בכש can also be used 
when the woman’s consent is not assumed, is not irrelevant to the plot, and 
the action is rape: הנעיו התא בכשיו התא חקיו “And he took her and lay with 
her and raped her” (Gen 34:2); התא בכשיו הנעיו הנממ קזחיו “And he grabbed 
her and raped her and lay with her” (2 Sam 13:14). However, in both these 
cases it is not the verb בכש that connotes rape, but the verb הנע “to rape/
abuse” used alongside it.28 In these instances, therefore, הנע must be used to 
make it clear that the woman’s consent was not irrelevant, and was not 
given.
In light of the previous discussion, the instances of בכש being used by 
women become easier to understand. In Genesis 19, the two daughters of 
Lot use it in their speech and the narrator also uses it to describe their 
actions in having sexual intercourse with their father. While their actions 
are understandable given that they believe themselves to be the only three 
people left on earth, what the daughters actually want is not necessarily just 
children but sexual activity itself: “And the elder said to the younger: ‘Our 
father is old and there is no man to come upon us [ונילע אובל] in the usual 
way [ץראה־לכ ךרדכ]. Come, let us make our father drink wine, so that we 
may sleep with him [ומע  הבכשנו] and we may have seed [ערז] from our 
father” (Gen 19:31–32). While both daughters become pregnant and give 
birth, that is not the way in which they express their desires. Instead, they 
wish for “a man to come upon us in the usual way,” and for “seed.” While 
that “seed” (ערז) may be understood as metaphorical for offspring (its usual 
metaphorical meaning), it may also be understood as the more literal 
semen: the daughters want the sexual act itself.29 Compare Sarah’s laughter 
28 Ellen van Wolde’s contention – הנע should be translated as “debase” rather than 
“rape” – is a distinction without a difference (E. van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape? 
A Semantic Analysis of a Controversial Word,” VT 52 [2002]: 528–544.). What consti-
tutes “rape” is a cultural construct. For example, up until 1983, legally there was no 
such thing as rape within marriage in Canada (see Department of Justice, Sexual 
Assault Legislation in Canada: An Evaluation [Ottawa: Department of Justice, Canada, 
1992]). Illegal forced sexual activity, which is what she suggests is happening in many 
of the cases of הנע in the Hebrew Bible, may appropriately be translated as “rape.” Other 
non-sexual activity may be translated as “abuse.”
29 Cf. Lev 15:18: the recognition that the sexual act involves “seed from lying” (ערז־תבכש); 
perhaps only acts that involved the exchange of semen were understood as sexual. See 
D. Tabb Stewart, “Leviticus,” in The Queer Bible Commentary (ed. Deryn Guest et al.; 
London: SCM, 2006), 77–104, here 89.
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upon overhearing Yhwh promising a son to Abraham in Gen 18:12: “Shall I 
have pleasure, my husband being old?”
The other use of בכש by a woman is the case of Potiphar’s wife, who fol-
lowed Joseph around, saying, “Lie with me!” (Gen 39:7, 12). Once he refuses 
her, her telling of the story to her slaves is interesting: she accuses Joseph of 
coming “to me to lie with me” (39:14). But to her husband she says, “The 
Hebrew slave whom you brought to us came to me to dally [קחצל] with me” 
(39:17). What she does not say is that he tried to rape her: there is no use of 
הנע; rather it is קחצ “to laugh, mock, fondle.” She displaces her own sexual 
desire onto Joseph, or implies that she had opportunities for sexual pleasure 
that she could have pursued if not for her upright character.
The root בכש, used by women, places the agency for sexual activity with 
men. Used of men, it refers to sexual activity with a woman, most clearly 
shown by the expression רכז בכשמל “the manner of lying of a male” in Num-
bers 31 and Judges 21. A woman may lie with a man, but his is still the active 
role. However, the verb בכש is also used of male sexual intercourse in Lev 
18:22 (and 20:13): השא בכשמ בכשת אל רכז־תאו “With a male never lie in the 
manner of lying of a woman.” Even though on the basis of the punishment 
in 20:13, interpreters often assume it means a man should not penetrate 
another man, given the above explanation of the root’s meaning of sexual 
activity with a woman, it more likely refers to a man performing a feminine-
gendered act.30 This text is not only about how masculinity as a gender is 
constructed or performed; it is also about the mutability of the body. The 
male body is not fixed: it easily becomes a female body. The meta-sexualiz-
ing of the body is the objectionable action. Compare the very next verse: 
ךתבכש  ןתת־אל  המהב־לכבו “To any animal never give your act of lying” 
(18:23; emphasis added). That is, do not have penetrative sexual activity 
with an animal. It is the man’s active role that must be proscribed in this case 
involving animals, but it is merely אמט “unclean.” A woman, on the other 
hand, who העברל המהב ינפל דמעת “stations herself in front of an animal for 
it to mate with her” (18:23; 20:16) is not performing a sexual act in the man-
ner of human beings; it is לבת “perverse, transgressive,” and the verb used is 
the verb used of animals (עבר). It is not only that she takes an active role by 
30 J. T. Walsh, “Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13: Who Is Doing What to Whom?” JBL 120 (2001): 
201–209, here 206–208. The classic text is S. M. Olyan, “‘And with a Male You Shall Not 
Lie the Lying down of a Woman’: On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 
and 20:13,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 5 (1994): 179–206. Cf. also D. Boyarin, 
“Are There Any Jews in ‘The History of Sexuality’?” Journal of the History of Sexuality 5 
(1995): 333–355. Stewart’s argument (“Leviticus” [see n. 29], 97–99.) that this text for-
bids male-on-male incest is a bit strained, based on only one linguistic example.
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stationing herself,31 but her body becomes the body of an animal: it is not a 
meta-sexualizing but a meta-species-ing act. She performs the feminine 
gender of an animal.
We have come far from the simple meaning of בכש “to lie,” but what we 
have learned is that a human man’s gender performance of relational sexual 
activity is at play when this verb or its derived nouns are used. Even when a 
woman uses the verb, she uses it to refer to relational sexual activity initi-
ated by a man. These two “neutral” verbs עדי and בכש, therefore, show an 
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are usually seen as opposites: אוב meaning motion towards and ךלה mean-
ing motion away: “come” and “go.” It is intriguing, therefore, that לא ךלה is 
used with a sexual sense only once in the Hebrew Bible corpus, in Amos 
2:7, where a man and his father go into the same young woman. Usually the 
verb used is אוב. Yet again, the translators prefer to render לא אוב as “go to” 
rather than “come into” when a sexual sense is inferred.33 A narratological 
31 Stewart, “Leviticus” (see n. 29), 85–86.
32 A clear example is found in Isa 8:3: רהתו האיבנה־לא ברקאו “I came near to the prophet-
ess and she conceived.” The NRSV reads “I went to”; the NJPS “I was intimate with”; the 
NIV “I made love to”; the KJV “I went unto”; the NASB “I approached.” Compare how 
the same versions translate Gen 37:18: םהילא  ברקי  םרטבו “Before he came near to 
them”: NRSV “before he came near to them”; NJPS and NASB “before he came close to 
them”; NIV “before he reached them”; KJV “before he came near unto them.”
33 An example is Gen 16:2: יתהפש לא אנ אב “Come into my serving-girl,” rendered in the 
NRSV as “Go into my slave girl; the NJPS as “Consort with my maid”; the NIV as “Go, 
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approach takes the focalization of these verbs seriously. When the mechan-
ics of the sexual act are considered, the act is focalized by the one being pen-
etrated. It is no doubt our own squeamishness about sex that leads transla-
tors to not translate רהתו רגה־לא אביו (Gen 16:4) as “And he entered Hagar 
and she conceived,” with the construction’s directness intact. In this light, 
לא אוב is not a euphemism for sexual intercourse. It is a very direct, graphic, 
and corporeal expression. It is modern translators who treat it as a euphe-
mism, and translate it with an English euphemism or idiomatic construc-
tion. Perhaps it is not an accident that the construction לא אוב is never used 
of male-to-male intercourse in the Hebrew Bible, at least not in a straight-
forward fashion.
One of the difficulties in Hebrew of using the construction לא אוב to rep-
resent sexual intercourse is that the same construction can be and was more 
often used non-sexually, as in Gen 19:5. While in most instances the 
intended sense is clear, there are a few instances where ambiguity can be 
read. In Josh 2:4, for example, Rahab tells the men of Jericho that: ילא ואב ןכ 
המה ןיאמ יתעדי אלו םישנאה “Yes, the men came (in)to me, but I don’t know 
where they were from.” Usually this verse is understood non-sexually, but 
why? Because virtuous Israelite spies would not have had sex with a 
prostitute?34 But Rahab is speaking to the men of Jericho: whether the Isra-
elite spies actually penetrated her or not, her neighbours would expect that 
they had.
Similarly, there are several instances where לא אוב is used in combination 
with תא/םע בכש, which seems to indicate that אוב is being used in its more 
common sense, with בכש denoting the sexual act. Genesis 19:34; 39:14 and 
2 Sam 11:4 all combine אוב with בכש. Importantly, these cases include the 
two instances where the woman is seen as the primary actor: ומע יבכש יאבו 
“You [f.] come in and lie with him!” (Gen 19:34); המע בכשיו וילא אובתו “And 
she came to him and he lay with her” (2 Sam 11:4). In the case of Potiphar’s 
wife, by using אוב and בכש she makes it clear that Joseph did not penetrate 
sleep with my slave”; the KJV as “Go in unto my maid”; and the NASB as “Go into my 
maid.” Again, we should compare a text like Gen 19:5, where the same construction is 
used in the non-sexual sense: הלילה ךילא ואב רשא “who came to you tonight,” rendered 
in the NRSV, NJPS, NIV and NASB as “who came to you tonight”; and in the KJV as 
“which came unto thee this night.”
34 R. D. Nelson, Joshua: A Commentary (OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 
43–44, 47 for an exception, even though his translation of the passage on p. 36 is entirely 
non-sexual. His reading strategy ultimately downplays this construal by locating it 
within the surface level of meaning rather than the deeper theological meaning of the 
Deuteronomiic History as a whole.
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her: לודג לוקב ארקאו ימע בכשל ילא אב “He came to me to lie with me but I 
shouted loudly.”
With the foregoing in mind, we can turn to two ambiguous instances of 
לא  אוב, Judg 4:21 and 3:20. The debate over the sexual nature of Jael’s 
actions in Judges 4 is extensive, and recently summarized by Pamela Tamar-
kin Reis.35 She proposes that there were two initial sexual acts between Jael 
and Sisera, which ended with Sisera telling her to guard the entrance of the 
tent in Judg 4:20. Then in Judg 4:21, Jael טאלב וילא אובתו “came (in)to him 
quietly.” It might seem that the use of אוב is the more usual one (that Jael 
approached him), and that reading it sexually contradicts the pattern of 
women not being the subject of the verb, but Jael does enter Sisera’s body 
with the tent peg.36 The phallic nature of her banging a tent-peg through 
Sisera’s temple, which seems obvious to me, is often not even commented 
on by recent commentators.37 Her body, rather than being fixed as a female 
body, metamorphosizes into a male body, and Sisera’s from a male to a 
female body. It is not only that they are meta-gendered in a performative 
way, as per Butler, but also they are meta-sexualized. Both the gendered 
expression of the body as well as the body itself are changed. The meta-gen-
dered aspect to the event is focalized by Sisera, the penetrated one, who 
takes on the usual female role of the one who is penetrated. Not only is he 
penetrated, he is raped – and we see the rape from his point of view: אובתו 
ץראב חנצתו ותקרב דתיה־תא עקתתו טאלב וילא “And she came into him quietly 
and nailed the tent-peg into his temple and got off him.”38 Then the focaliza-
tion shifts to Jael: תמיו ףעיו םדרנ־אוהו “And he was deeply asleep and weary 
and died” (Judg 4:21). This reversal is especially pointed considering how 
Sisera and Jael met in Judg 4:18: הילא רסיו ארית־לא ילא הרוס ינדא הרוס רמאתו 
הלהאה “And she said, ‘Turn, my lord, turn into me, don’t be afraid.’ And he 
turned into her, in the tent.” While there is no other instance of רוס being 
35 P. Tamarkin Reis, “Uncovering Jael and Sisera: A New Reading,” SJOT 19 (2005): 
24–47; Cf. E. van Wolde, “Ya‘el in Judges 4,” ZAW 107 (1995): 240–46, here 245. Reis’s 
essay provoked a response by R. B. Chisholm Jr., “What Went on in Jael’s Tent? The 
Collocation והכימשב והסכת in Judges 4,18,” SJOT 24 (2010): 143–44, who categorically 
refuses to see anything sexual in this passage.
36 In Reis’s reading, which is imaginative and thorough, somehow she misses the use of 
אוב here: it would have strengthened her reading considerably; Reis, “Uncovering Jael” 
(see n. 35), 32. Considering that she construes הילא אוביו “And [Barak] came to her” in 
v. 22 as sexual, it is surprising she missed אוב in v. 21 (Ibid., 34–35.).
37 T. J. Schneider, Judges (Berit Olam; Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2000), 79–80; Bal, 
Murder and Difference (see n. 1), 122–124.
38 The “difficulty” of construing חנצת, and whether its antecedent is Jael, the peg, or Sis-
era’s temple (Schneider, Judges [see n. 37], 80.) is only a difficulty when the action is not 
understood as sexual.
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used sexually in the Hebrew Bible, it is a possibility here. Jael is the focalizer 
initially, playing the female role. Both Sisera and Jael act in ways that are 
typically gendered masculine and feminine; both have their bodies trans-
formed into other bodies.
A similar ambiguity can be seen in the previous chapter in Ehud’s killing 
Eglon. The number of scholars who have resisted reading this as male-on-
male sex is really quite astonishing,39 although it must be admitted that the 
text is very unspecific: “Ehud came to/entered him [וילא אב] – and [Eglon] 
was sitting alone in his cool upper room – and Ehud said, ‘I have something 
divine [יל  םיהלא־רבד] for you.’ And he got up from his throne, and Ehud 
used his left hand to take the dagger from his right thigh, and he nailed it 
[העקתיו] into his belly/womb [ונטבב]. Also the shaft entered after the blade” 
(Judg 3:20–22). In this case, the first sexual act, in v. 20, is consensual, with 
the rape/murder happening as the second sexual act in vv. 21–22, intro-
duced nebulously as “a divine word” or “something divine.” Both Ehud and 
Jael nailed (עקת) their partner-victims, both entered them. It surely is not 
insignificant that Saul, after not wanting to be pierced or toyed with (ללעתה) 
in 1 Samuel 31, ends up with his body nailed (עקת) to the wall of Beth-Shan. 
Eglon’s body is permeable, unfixed; even down to his belly/womb; every 
other instance of ןטב in Judges (13:5, 7; 16:17) refers to a womb, so it could 
be read here.
To come into or to enter someone: this is the action of a man entering a 
woman in the Hebrew texts. But the action is focalized by the woman. This 
kind of intimacy, this kind of experience of sexuality is shown to us from the 
woman’s perspective. But this experience of sexuality described by לא אוב is 
never used of sexual intercourse legitimized by a (first) marriage. The con-
struction is used in several passages (Gen 6:4; 16:2, 4; 19:31; 30:3, 4; 38:8, 9; 
Deut 22:13; 25:5; Judg 15:1; 16:1; 2 Sam 16:21, 22; 20:3; Ezek 23:44; Prov 
2:19; 6:29). All but Deut 22:13 occur in one of several specific situations: 1. 
The woman is a secondary wife of some kind (Hagar, Bilhah, David’s con-
cubines); 2. The woman has already been married (Tamar, the case of Deu-
39 E. g., L. G. Stone, “Eglon’s Belly and Ehud’s Blade: A Reconsideration,” JBL 128 (2009): 
649–663, here 654 n. 19; J. M. Sasson, “Ethically Cultured Interpretations: The Case of 
Eglon’s Murder (Judges 3),” in Homeland and Exile: Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern 
Studies in Honour of Bustenay Oded (ed. G. Galil, M. Geller, and A. R. Millard; VTSup 
130; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 571–595. An excellent summary of the history of reading the 
passage as homoerotic may be found in D. Guest, “Judges,” in The Queer Bible Com-
mentary (ed. D. Guest et al.; London: SCM, 2006), 167–189, here 168–177. A briefer 
analysis which subsumes the features as “sexual,” without explicitly discussing male-on-
male intercourse or rape, is found in M. Zvi Brettler, The Creation of History in Ancient 
Israel (London: Routledge, 1995), 82.
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teronomy 25); 3. The woman is described or perceived as a zonah (prosti-
tute) or an adulteress (Gazite woman, Oholah and Oholibah, cases in 
Proverbs); 4. The woman is not in a marriage and thus implied to be pro-
miscuous (Genesis 6, Lot’s daughters). Of the two remaining cases, Sam-
son’s Timnite wife in Judg 15:1 is perceived by Samson as having been adul-
terous: she was given to another man. The final remaining case, the only 
one where it appears to deal with marriage, is Deut 22:13–14: שיא  חקי־יכ 
םילותב הל יתאצמ־אלו הילא ברקאו … האנשו הילא אבו השא “If a man marries a 
woman and enters her, then hates her, [he must say] ‘I came into her but I 
did not find her a virgin’.” Since the woman is ultimately not found a virgin 
(on his say-so, admittedly), but is sexually experienced, she must be a pros-
titute or promiscuous: presumably an earlier marriage would have been dis-
closed in the marriage negotiations. If the two ambiguous cases in Judges 3 
and 4 are included in the analysis, the implication is that both Sisera and 
Eglon were experienced as the female partners; they were not virgins. Thus 
in Hebrew only the sexually experienced – or those assumed to be so – 
focalize their penetration. Never in all the depictions of virgins is their 
experience of their first intercourse depicted. Neither do objects of rape 
have their experience depicted, whether the Levite’s pilegesh, or Absalom’s 
sister Tamar, or Dinah. Why might this be the case? A Freudian would no 
doubt find a fear of virginity,40 but I am reading from a different standpoint. 
From a standpoint of corporeality, how are virgins and objects of rape simi-
lar?
Corporeality and sexuality
The privileging of man/mind over woman/body in Western thought is 
pervasive, and should be understood as a philosophical construction within 
Western thought. But the Hebrew Bible, a non-Platonic corpus (with the 
possible exception of Qohelet), is especially disserved when read through 
Western eyes. One index is the language used of sex. Translators have been 
particularly guilty of inscribing Western concepts of the body on the text: 
sexual intercourse is always focalized by the man; euphemisms in English 
hide the corporeality of the act in Hebrew. Yet there is a large lacuna in the 
corporeality of sex in Hebrew literature: the virgin woman and/or the object 
of rape. S/he never is the agent of focalization – even an animal is! S/he is 
the character that is not corporeal, not embodied. Dinah, Absalom’s sister 
40 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry (see n. 1), 41–59.
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Tamar, Lot’s daughters, the Levite’s pilegesh, the virgins of Shiloh, in none of 
their cases do we read with their experience.41 For men and sexually expe-
rienced women, the corporeal nature of sexuality is clear. Sexuality is per-
formative and metamorphic: it has the power to turn a man’s body into a 
woman’s, to turn a woman’s body into a man’s, to turn a woman’s body into 
an animal’s.
In her essay on paranoid reading, Sedgwick asks feminist and queer read-
ers what all our hermeneutics of suspicion has brought us. By labelling these 
hermeneutics a paranoid practice, she makes her point clear: not much! She 
also points out that uncovering and exposing oppression does not neces-
sarily lead to the end of that oppression; she asks not what knowledge is, 
but what knowledge does.42 It is not enough to understand systemic oppres-
sions, because that does not compel anyone to end oppressive structures. 
Quite the opposite, in fact: The hermeneutics of suspicion operates under 
the assumption that the means and methods of oppression are hidden and 
must be exposed – it is “trusting about the effects of exposure” – but when 
there are so many forms of violence that are flaunted rather than hidden, 
exposing violence and oppression as a means of eradicating it seems rather 
quaint.43 On the other hand, as Grosz suggests, “Without concept, without 
theory, practice has no hope, its goal is only reversal and redistribution, not 
transformation.”44 While I have not sought to expose oppressive structures 
in the text, I have tried to expose some oppressive reading practices. We 
already know that virginity and rape are problematic in biblical texts, and 
this is hardly hidden, so pointing it out does not advance the dismantling of 
oppressive systems.
However, Sedgwick’s point earlier in the same essay is worth reiterating: 
sexual difference is assumed and then found by commentators. I have tried 
to avoid this tautology; perhaps I have even succeeded! The crucial differ-
ence in these texts about sex is not sexual difference: Several cases have 
shown that sexual difference can be metamorphosized. The crucial differ-
ence is in sexual experience. Men, women, and even animals know sexual 
experience in an embodied way, and all of their perspectives are available.45 
For men and women it is knowing (עדי), for men it is sleeping with (םע בכש) 
41 By reading this way, the rapes of Eglon and Sisera are occluded as consensual: they 
“wanted it.” In both stories, in the readings above it is implied that there was consensual 
intercourse prior to the rapes. Does this make a difference?
42 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling (see n. 2), 124.
43 Ibid., 138–140.
44 Grosz, Becoming Undone (see n. 2), 83, emphasis original.
45 Cf. Ibid., 86 for a gesture towards theorizing human sexual difference within a broader 
animal world.
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for women it is someone coming into (לא  אוב) her. For virgins – and only 
female virgins are available as characters for our study – and objects of rape, 
it is different: They do not know and they are not come into. They are disem-
bodied, incorporeal. Sexual difference is not the binary construct, sexual 
embodiment is. Gender roles are fluid, and not tied to sexual difference. 
The sex-gender dichotomy breaks down as a tool of analysis.
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